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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND NEW DEVICES: DEFINING
AN ELUSIVE STANDARD OF CARE
Michael D. Greenbergt
ABSTRACT
Early adoption of a new medical device by a physician carries
with it some degree of malpractice liability risk. The legal standard
for malpractice varies from place to place, but generally requires an
evaluation of the physician's conduct either against that of a hypothetical "reasonable physician," or else against professional custom.
Where the use of a new device involves a significant departure from
traditional modalities of care, and a bad clinical result follows,
questions may arise about whether the legal standard for malpractice
has been violated. We suggest that a liberal interpretation of the
malpractice standard of care is appropriate, and even necessary to
avoid the potential for perverse disincentives to technical innovation
in medicine.

INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice is one of the most controversial aspects of
American tort law. Over the past 30 years, advocates for tort reform
have encroached significantly on the traditional contours of
negligence liability associated with the practice of medicine.' That
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shift has partly been grounded on arguments that tort is an inefficient
or inappropriate way to compensate injuries, and that malpractice
claiming is associated with negative externalities and broader social
welfare effects that call into question the fundamental soundness of
malpractice liability doctrine. 2 A related set of questions has been
raised by the patient safety movement in the United States, and by
research that suggests that at least some medically induced injuries
may better be understood as resulting from complex medical care
processes and inherent risk trade-offs, rather than from specific acts of
malfeasance committed by specific providers.3
These sorts of
systemic insights suggest new ambiguities connected with traditional
legal concepts in medical malpractice, and particularly so regarding
the standard of care required of practitioners. For judges and policymakers, the implication is that traditional legal concepts and doctrines
may need to be re-examined and fine-tuned, in recognition that those
rules may sometimes have unintended consequences that reach
beyond any discrete malpractice dispute or occurrence of medical
injury.
An important example of this kind of problem involves the
relationship between medical malpractice and new technology
adoption. Negligence and malpractice doctrine generally make it
clear that standards of care are evolutionary rather than static, and that
providers have an obligation to stay abreast of new techniques and
developments.4 By implication, the malpractice standard in 2008 is
different from what it was in 1978, less because of any changes in the
law than because of changes in medical knowledge and in new technologies. But the simple recognition that medical knowledge changes
over time provides scarce insight into the reality that those changes do
not occur seamlessly, but by fits and starts, with the serial introduction
of a multitude of new drugs, new devices, and new techniques, each
of which starts out as experimental agent with imperfectly known
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009). See also the summary discussion offered by the Am. Tort
Reform
Ass'n,
Medical
Liability
Reform,
http://www.atra.org/issues/
index.php?issue=7338 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
2 See, e.g., David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Health Policy Report: Medical Malpractice,350 N. ENGL. J. MED. 283, 283 (2004).
3 See Stephen C. Schoenbaum & Randall R. Bovbjerg, MalpracticeReform
Must Include Steps to Prevent Medical Injury, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 51, 51-53
(2004); Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical
Malpracticeas a Barrier,283 JAMA 1742, 1742 (2000).
4 For a discussion of relevant case law, see generally Carter L. Williams,
Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What
Effect Will EBM Have on the Standardof Care? 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 479, 50812 (2004).
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risks, and each of which involves a departure from what most physicians are doing, ex ante, in providing care for their patients. Broadly
speaking, the malpractice standard of care assumes, and depends
upon, this kind of innovation in medical treatment. Far less clear is
how the standard of care applies to any particular instance where an
injury is associated with services that are occurring on the event
horizon of medical progress, and drawing on new technologies that
have not yet been incorporated into the practice and experience of
most physicians.
Legal ambiguity around what the standard of care really means, in
this kind of circumstance, implies that physicians (and their lawyers)
may genuinely not know the degree of malpractice liability risk that is
associated with adopting a new clinical technology. By itself, that
may present a problem for judges after the fact, in determining appropriate rules and incentives for apportioning liability fairly. More important, though, is the potential for far-reaching effects on physicians
(and other care providers) in their willingness to adopt new technologies, given ill-defined but perceived malpractice liability risks associated with doing so. 5 By implication, malpractice law may sometimes
present a deterrent to medical innovation, and a market barrier to
demand for new technologies, even where those technologies offer
broad social benefits in the form of superior clinical outcomes and/or
reduced administrative costs. At a minimum, judges and policymakers concerned with malpractice law need also to be cognizant of the
which
wider context of the U.S. healthcare delivery system, within
6
tort rules may exert undesirable or unanticipated side-effects.
The purpose of this paper is to address the basic question of how
medical malpractice liability standards apply to physicians, in connection with their adoption of new medical equipment and devices. This
paper also analyzes the logic suggesting that legal ambiguities in the
malpractice standard of care might lead to systematic disincentives for
physicians (or hospitals) in adopting new medical technologies, at
least under some circumstances. In Part I, we review the basic legal
5 As one pair of commentators has pointed out, law sometimes exerts its

effect on the healthcare system by influencing the perceptions and expectations of
market actors, in ways that can change their business practices based on anticipated
(but not necessarily realized) adverse legal outcomes. See M. Gregg Bloche & David
M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an Agent of Health System Change, 23
HEALTH AFFAIRS 29, 39 (2004).

6 See MICHELLE M. MELLO, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE CRISIS

AND EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS

(2006) for a discussion of empirical evidence

concerning "defensive medicine" and adverse physician supply effects.
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concepts and standards that underlie medical malpractice doctrine. In
Part II, we discuss why new technology can present a special problem
for analyzing whether malpractice has been committed. In Part III,
we observe that U.S. case law has neglected to address this special
problem head-on, but we nevertheless identify a series of potential
steps that physician-adopters can take, and which common sense
suggests would help to mitigate liability risks associated with using
new medical technologies. In Part IV, we briefly consider how
malpractice liability related to new devices and equipment might
extend to hospitals, and by implication, to other corporate entities that
are involved in the delivery of health care services. And in Part V, we
discuss the potential for negative externalities associated with
ambiguous malpractice standards and new technology adoption, and
some related considerations for policymakers. In sum, we observe
that American case law does not appear directly to have addressed the
problem of malpractice risk associated with innovative new technology use; that this problem may nevertheless be more important than
the dearth of case law would indicate; and that policymakers may
largely be able to neutralize the problem, simply by making explicit to
physicians what the standard of care truly requires in connection with
adopting a new medical device.
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE LEGAL STANDARD OF CARE
Medical malpractice is a form of tort, or in other words, a civil
claim in which an injured person requests damages from an alleged
perpetrator, in compensation for a wrongful, harmful act. As with
negligence-based torts more generally, a claim for medical malpractice generally requires that the plaintiff establish four basic legal
elements in order to obtain a recovery. First, she must show that the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; second, that that duty
was breached by the defendant; third, that the plaintiff was harmed
(and experienced damages); and fourth, that the plaintiffs harm was
caused by the defendant's actions. 7 Inability to establish any of these
elements will undermine a claim of negligence (or of medical
malpractice), and will cause the plaintiffs case to fail.
In most medical malpractice cases, the duty prong is fairly straight
forward. When a physician actually provides medical services to a
patient, a professional duty of care is thereby established. 8 The
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (W. Page Keeton
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
8 For a discussion of the general rule and the complexities posed by tele7
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damages and causation prongs in medical malpractice are also
frequently straight forward (e.g., where a surgical error clearly results
in a patient's injury or disfigurement). For current purposes, the most
important (and complex) legal requirement for malpractice is breach:
i.e., not only that a physician owed a duty of care to her patient, but
that by her actions she somehow violated that duty. Establishing
whether a breach has taken place requires a comparison between the
physician's actions and a legal "standard of care," which represents
what physicians are obligated by law to do in providing medical
services to their patients. Determining how the legal standard of care
applies to a particular clinical situation is sometimes ambiguous, and
it usually involves
tapping the expertise, opinions and testimony of
9
physicians.
other
The basic legal standard of care in most general negligence cases
is the "reasonable person" standard. In essence, the law asks the question: what would a reasonable person have done if faced with the
same set of circumstances as did the defendant?10 Where the defendant's conduct is found not to be reasonable by comparison, then the
defendant has breached the duty of care, and may be held liable for
negligence (provided that the other legal requirements for the tort
claim, including damages and causation, are also established). Clearly, determining what the "reasonable person" standard of care requires, in the context of a particular situation, is somewhat subjective. It depends on the ex post determination of judges and juries
(collectively, reasonable people), based on their own experience and
judgment, together with a review of the defendant's conduct, plus any
other relevant evidence about what similarly situated persons would
do when confronted with similar circumstances."

medicine, see Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and IntegratedHealth Care Delivery:
CompoundingMalpracticeLiability, 25 AM. J.L. &MED. 297, 307-18; Kip Poe, Telemedicine Liability: Texas and Other States Delve into the Uncertainties of Health
Care Delivery via Advanced Communications Technology, 20 REv. LITIG. 681, 693
(2001).
9 See Ben A. Rich, Medical Custom and Medical Ethics: Rethinking the
Standardof Care, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHics 27, 27-28 (2005).
10 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, at 169; cf

Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 3 Bing. 467, 472 (N.C.) (U.K.) ("[G]ross negligence
ought to be estimated by the faculties of the individual, and not by those of other
men.").
11See generally Stephen G. Giles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard,and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv.
813 (2001) (discussing the role of judges and juries in applying the reasonable person
standard and the Learned Hand formula).
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Applying a negligence-based standard of care to situations involving technical or professional practice presents some special
challenges. This is true, in part, because the intuitions of juries about
what is "reasonable" may not be well-suited to evaluating professional
or technical activities, which often fall outside the direct experience
and competence of most jury members. The legal standard that
applies to these situations shifts .slightly. First of all, the standard for
negligence (or malpractice) in a medical context is usually determined
by reference to what a reasonable physician would have done-i.e., a
person with the same kind of technical background, training, and
expertise as the defendant. 12 Second, figuring out what that standard
of care actually means in a particular malpractice case typically
involves reviewing evidence about what sorts of clinical practices are
customary in the field of medicine: i.e., to determine what a reasonable physician should do in a given situation, we seek evidence about
what physicians typically do in practice.13
Different states have formulated the legal standard of care for
malpractice in somewhat different ways. 14 Traditionally, the law has
been very deferential to physician custom in determining what qualifies as malpractice. In other words, whatever constituted usual or
typical medical care in a region was often formally defined as reasonable conduct, and where a physician's treatment comported with
professional custom, this was sufficient to avoid any breach in the
duty of care.1 5 Although customary practice remains the legal
12 See Ruth Ellen Smalley, Comment, Will A Lawsuit A Day Keep the Cy-

berdocs Away? Modern Theories of Medical Malpracticeas Applied to Cybermedicine, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 29 (Winter 2001), available at http://
www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i3/article3.html; see also Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine: E-Health, Medical
Errors, and Technology Add New Obstacles, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 470-73 (2002);
cf. McNeely v. M. & M. Supermarkets, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 483, 485 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding the ordinarily prudent person standard, rather than one of individual judgment, applied); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 786 (Or. 1970)
(holding a person is negligent only if he or she, as an ordinary reasonable person,
ought reasonably to foresee the exposure of another to an unreasonable risk of harm).
13 See Rich, supra note 9, at 27-28.
14 See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment
and the Objective Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 49
(1999) (arguing that "[viarious formulations for the standard of care in medical malpractice cases" exist; "these formulations remain essentially objective.") (footnote
omitted); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163 (2000) (recognizing the
erosion of judicial consensus favoring deference to customary standards of care and
an on-going shift in favor of reasonableness standards).
15 See Peters, supra note 14, at 164-70. Note that the "customary practice"
standard is more deferential to medical expertise and judgment than the reasonable
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standard for malpractice in many states, almost half of the states have
adopted an objective "reasonable care" standard instead. Rather than
being based on what the majority of medical practitioners actually do,
this standard is based on what is "reasonable to expect of a professional given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the treatment in issue."1 6 The differences between these two versions of the
malpractice standard of care are subtle, because in most instances, the
customary practices of most physicians do correspond closely to an
objective standard of reasonableness based on the current state of the
art in medicine.' 7 In principle, though, an objective "reasonable care"
standard gives judges and juries more latitude in reviewing medical
knowledge and customs in deciding what the applicable malpractice
standard should be in a given circumstance.
There are a number of other common law doctrines that contribute
to defining the malpractice standard of care.' 8 Many jurisdictions
recognize an "adverse outcomes" admonition or rule, which establishes that the simple fact of a poor outcome following a medical
procedure does not itself imply that malpractice has occurred. 9
Likewise, many jurisdictions also follow some version of an "acceptable alternatives" rule, which establishes that the standard of care in
medicine is not unitary, and that there are many medical situations
where multiple forms of treatment may be consistent with reasonable
care. 20 In a related vein, there are also legal doctrines that allow for
participation in clinical trials, and recognize that delivering experiperson/ reasonable physician standard. See id. at 180-85.
16 Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996); accord King,
supra note 14, at 51-55; Peters, supra note 14, at 180-85. Cf Vergara v. Doan, 593
N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ind. 1992) (holding that the standard of care "uses locality as but
one of the factors to be considered in determining whether the doctor acted reasonably."); Shilkrett v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 253 (Md. 1975)
(holding a physician has a duty to use that degree of care and skill expected of similarly-situated reasonably competent practitioners, acting in the same or similar
circumstances and considering "advances in the profession" together with all other
relevant considerations).
17See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-6 (1992); see also
Peters, supra note 14, at 188-90 (distinguishing between deviations from accepted,
customary, practices as opposed to unacceptable or unreasonable practices).
1s For a summary of these doctrines and relevant case citations,
see Peters,
supra note 14, at 166-68 and King, supra note 14, at 56-63.
19See, e.g., Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 835 (Haw. 1998).
20 See id.
at 834; see also Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 478 (1st Cir. 1994);
Parris v. Sands, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that absent
unusual circumstances physicians lack a duty to inform a patient of a nonrecommended course of treatment based upon views of other health care providers).
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mental treatment in a clinical trial does not of itself constitute malpractice, even though such trials might otherwise be viewed as a departure from customary care. 2' Finally, the legal doctrines governing
malpractice standards of care also include a "duty to stay abreast,"
which means that physicians have an obligation to be aware of evolving practices in medical care, and to make appropriate use of new
22
scientific knowledge in medicine as it emerges.
The specific legal standard for malpractice differs from state to
state, not only in its degree of deference to custom in defining reasonable care, but also in terms of details like whether reasonableness is
determined by reference to a local or national comparison group of
physicians.2 3 Regardless, all versions of the malpractice standard are
ultimately based on an evaluation of the appropriateness of a physician's conduct, by comparison to what reasonable physicians either
do, or should do, in similar circumstances. The latter is usually
determined by reference to the customary practices of other
physicians, as established through expert testimony.
II. NEW MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE
MALPRACTICE STANDARD OF CARE
Given that medical practice is not static, and that new clinical
interventions and technologies are constantly being developed, an
obvious question arises regarding how these new developments get
incorporated into the malpractice standard of care.24 For purposes of
illustration, we will focus here on an example case of treatment using
a new medical device. We assume for the sake of argument that the
device does not present any immediate, transparent new risks to
patients. On the other hand, application of the device does involve a
somewhat modified set of clinical practices from the status quo, and
possibly entails a different set of clinical risks from those that a
patient would have faced under conventional treatment. 25 If some21 See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974).

22 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
23 See generally John C. Dmpp IH, The National Standardof Care in Medical MalpracticeActions: Does Small Area Analysis Make it Another Legal Fiction?, 6

QuINNIP'Ac HEALTH L.J. 95 (2003) (discussing the distinction between a local versus
a national standard of care).
24 See Sokol & Molzen, supra note 12, at 451-56.
25 To clarify, we can imagine some new medical devices, like a hypothetical
tongue depressor made out of carbon fiber composite rather than of wood, which
would not pose any new risks to patients. By contrast, we could also imagine other
new medical devices, like a hypothetical laser-laparascopic machine for doing surgical procedures, which might or might not impose new risks in patient care, but which
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thing goes wrong in connection with treatment using the new device,
how does the malpractice standard of care then apply?
There is no simple, easy answer to this question. Again, the
general standard of care in malpractice involves some variation on the
reasonableness of a physician's conduct, usually as determined by
comparison to what other physicians would do in similar circumstances. A narrow interpretation of this standard could put a heavy
burden onto the early adoption of a specific new medical device, since
most other physicians would not yet be using that device, and any
departure from customary practice might plausibly be construed as
unreasonable. But a more nuanced perspective on the standard of care
would recognize that clinical practices obviously do change over time,
and that physicians frequently do employ new technologies and new
techniques. By implication, the reasonableness of using a new device
cannot be judged simply from the fact that it has not yet been widely
adopted. Rather, a "reasonableness" or even a "customary" analysis
would have to reflect on the circumstances under which physicians
generally adopt and use new devices, even where those adoptions
entail a substantial change from customary care.
One of the issues that this scenario raises is a closer examination
of the risk properties of a new medical device. It is easy to imagine
some hypothetical devices that would have no impact on underlying
clinical risks, or else that would be risk-superior to status quo treatment (i.e., by reducing the possibilities of harm or adverse outcome to
patients). Even where such devices are new, it seems unlikely that
anyone would construe their use by physicians as unreasonable-a
new device that offers benefits with no incremental risks seems like a
clearly desirable innovation, and one that would not harm patients in
any event. By contrast, a new device that does carry incremental risks
will be much more problematic under the malpractice standard of
care. Even so, there may be circumstances where the adoption and
use of such a device would still be reasonable under the law. But figuring out whether this is the case would presumably call for a close
review of the risks and benefits posed by the device, how those apply
to a particular clinical situation, and, in turn, how all of that comports
with the use of new devices by physicians more generally. In practice, the risks associated with a new device will often be somewhat
ambiguous to physicians, because experience with the new device will
be limited. The greater the ambiguity in clinical risk, the more difficult it becomes for physicians to know how the malpractice standard
clearly would transform the clinical procedures that patients would undergo. For our
discussion here, we are interested in the latter sort of device.
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of care will apply. By corollary, the potential for malpractice liability
becomes greater.
On a related point, it is also important to consider whether a new
medical device entails a transformation in related processes or procedures of medical care. We could imagine, for example, a "new" surgical retractor, which differs only modestly from traditional retractors,
and which does not really involve any qualitative shift in the kinds of
surgical procedures that physicians perform. To the extent that the
new device is not salient, does not change the way that physicians
practice, and does not carry any unique clinical risks, then its use is
unlikely by itself to violate the malpractice standard of care. But this
is a very different hypothetical from a device which actually does
introduce a major change into the way that physicians practice.
Where the processes of clinical care shift as a function of adopting a
new medical device, the impact of that device becomes much more
salient, and it invites closer scrutiny regarding any new risks that device-enabled care may pose. Even in the latter case, adoption of the
new device may still be "reasonable" and consistent with the malpractice standard, but it clearly carries more responsibility and greater
potential for liability among adopting physicians.
American case law on negligence and medical malpractice is
noteworthy for including a couple of landmark cases in which defendants were held liable for their failure to adopt new technologies or
procedures, even when near universal custom did not involve using
them.26 The holdings in those cases reserved to the courts ultimate
judgment in defining the reasonableness standard in relation to defendants' conduct, despite contrary evidence regarding what most similarly situated physicians (or in another canonical case, barge captains)
felt was appropriate.27 Although the specific precedents in these cases
focused ultimately on judicial authority, and their legal validity today
is questionable, the cases nevertheless illustrate two important points.
First, they help to show that legal standards of care do change over
time in response to new technology. Adoption of new medical
devices may start out as a risky and liability-prone process, but with
time and experience, those same devices can become increasingly
26

See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 737-38, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding a

tug boat operator liable for the loss of a barge that could have been averted through
the use of a radio); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 981, 985 (Wash. 1974) (holding
an ophthalmologist liable for an injury that could have been prevented through a
glaucoma pressure test); cf. Washington v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding a hospital liable for failing to use continuous oximetry
technology to reduce the risk of anesthesia-related brain injury).
27 See Epstein, supra note 17 at 32-36; Peters, supra note 14, at 170-72.
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attractive, and eventually their adoption may become mandatory.
Second, the cases suggest again that determinations about "reasonableness" and the malpractice standard depend on how broadly we
construe the reference group against which a particular behavior (or
new device adoption) is being judged. A narrow view regarding the
adoption of a specific new device, where most physicians are continuing to practice in the conventional way, may suggest one outcome. A
broader view may accommodate the reality that physicians sometimes
do (and should) adopt new devices, and that modem medicine in fact
depends on that kind innovation. This is a perspective on new devices
that suggests a different, and more flexible, malpractice standard of
care.
In sum, we note that a quick review of American case law generates very few appellate decisions that address directly the malpractice
standard of care in relation to medically induced injuries that allegedly
result from the application of new technologies. In one such case
from Louisiana in 1993, a court upheld a liability ruling against a
physician who had performed a femoral arteriogram using a new
imaging technology, based on the principle that "it is a breach of the
standardof care... to subject a patient to a particulartest orprocedure which has any risk of injury... ifthat doctor knows or reasonably should know that the procedure will be of no benefit to the
patient."28 Other U.S. cases involving the "off-label" use of medical
devices and pharmaceuticals have generated rulings suggesting that
off-label usage can be relevant to determining the standard of care
(and informed consent requirements), but that it is not dispositive, by
itself, in establishing whether malpractice has taken place.29
Importantly, U.S. case law has not established any distinct principles
for evaluating the malpractice standard of care in the context of new
medical devices or procedures, as opposed to other clinical situations
involving alleged malpractice. 30 Neither have the courts established
Riser v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 620 So.2d 372, 377 (La. Ct. App. 1993). In
the case at issue, the defendant physician reportedly did believe that there was some
potential benefit in the new procedure to the patient, but the record of expert evidence
actually produced at trial failed to support his point of view. Id. at 377-78.
29Cf.Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
a prescription drug's labeling or its PDR reference, when introduced along with other
expert evidence on the standard of care, is admissible to assist the trier-of-fact to
determine whether the prescribed drug presented an unacceptable risk to the patient);
Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 918-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding
that the defendant doctor "was not required to disclose to plaintiff [patient] the FDA
investigational status of [a medical device] in order for plaintiff to have given an
informed consent to the surgery").
30 Note, however, that British and European courts reportedly have devel28
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any distinction between applicable malpractice standards connected
with new devices that are believed to offer unique therapeutic benefit,
as opposed to new devices whose primary advantage is reduced cost
when compared to conventional treatment.
III. MITIGATING MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
ASSOCIATED WITH NEW DEVICES
So far, we have established that the precise legal standard of care
in malpractice differs somewhat from state to state, but that it is
usually based on reasonableness or professional custom, and informed
by reference to what other physicians would do when presented with
similar circumstances. We have also established that the standard of
care can be ambiguous as applied to the adoption by a physician of a
new medical device. That ambiguity is partly a function of the risk
implications of the device itself (which may not be well understood),
but also of the way in which courts construe the legal standard for
malpractice, and whether that standard is viewed more narrowly (e.g.,
with regard to treatment for a specific clinical condition), or more
broadly (e.g., with regard to reasonable circumstances for physicians'
adopting and using new technologies and techniques). By implication, then, the use of a new medical device by a physician can result in
increased potential for malpractice liability, particularly where the
device does impose new clinical risks, and/or involves a transformation in underlying processes of care. So given this potential for
expanded liability, is there anything that physicians can do to mitigate
their malpractice risks, consonant with their legal duties of care? Put
another way, can we infer anything about what reasonable physicians
in connection with their adoption of
would or should do generally,
31
technologies?
medical
new
oped principles for determining the medical standard of care in connection with new
device use (or "therapeutic experimentation"). See Dieter Giesen, Civil Liability of
Physiciansfor New Methods of Treatment and Experimentation: A Comparative
Examination, 3 MED. L. REv. 22, 31-32 (1995). According to Giesen, the European
legal standard in these cases tends to involve 3 questions. "[F]irst, was there a normal
[medical] practice which the law would have accepted?" Id. at 28. "[Slecond[], did
the doctor deviate from that practice?" Id. "[T]hird[] (and most importantly) was his
deviation such as reasonable physicians exercising due care and skill would not have
carried out?" Id. at 28-29.
31 Of course, one of the most important things that any physician can do to
protect against malpractice risk is to consult with a lawyer about the specific legal
malpractice standards and precedents that apply in her jurisdiction, and how those
might relate to the adoption of a particular new device. Our discussion here focuses
on other precautionary measures, consistent with "reasonable" conduct among physicians more generally.
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The first, obvious criterion for using a new device appropriately
involves knowing something about its safety and effectiveness. If a
physician knows nothing about the new device, and has no idea
whether it is safe or superior to conventional treatment alternatives,
then by using the device the physician would be exposing her patients
to an unknown set of risks. By contrast, where the physician has a
clear understanding of the safety and effectiveness of the new device,
and of the scientific evidence base that supports it, the physician is in
a much better position to decide whether clinical use of the device is
appropriate. In general, it seems intuitive that reasonable physicians
would want to understand the scientific evidence base that supports a
new device or new equipment as a predicate to employing it clinically.
As a consequence, it is likely that obtaining and reviewing this kind of
evidence about a new device may be implicit in the malpractice
standard of care.
Note that in practice, all new medical devices in the U.S. will fall
into one of several FDA classifications, of which the most burdensome is Class III. New Class III devices require pre-market approval
by the FDA and supporting clinical trials because of otherwise insufficient information to ensure their safety and effectiveness.3 2 Where
Class III device trials have been conducted, knowledge that a device
has actually been approved by the FDA, together with familiarity with
the scientific trial results and any labeling instructions, would seem
like basic information that any reasonable physician would want to
have about a new device. Likewise, a failure to receive FDA market
approval would also be information that most physicians would want
to know concerning a new device. The key idea is not the details of
the FDA's regulatory mechanism, but rather that significant information about the safety and effectiveness of new devices may often be
generated through FDA mandated trials. And again, where any kind
of scientific evidence base exists describing the risks and benefits of a
new device, a physician can likely help to protect herself under the
malpractice standard simply by becoming familiar with that evidence
base and drawing upon it in making treatment decisions.
Another potential avenue for physicians to protect themselves
from device-related malpractice liability involves obtaining appropriate training and expertise prior to actually using a new device. Again,
the idea is for physicians to do those things that are reasonably within
32

For a discussion on the background of the FDA regulatory scheme con-

cerning new medical devices, see Ellen J. Flannery, The Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990: An Overview, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 129 (1991) and Howard M. Holstein,
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: Product Approval Changes and Access to
PMA Data,46 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 153, 153 (1991).
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their power in order fully to understand a new device, and thereby to
use it safely and effectively. Presumably, the idea of obtaining
appropriate training would apply most directly to complicated pieces
of medical equipment, where optimal usage may require some degree
of instruction or supervision to achieve. Clearly, whenever a new
medical device entails clinical risks that can be mitigated by the skill
of the practitioner, the physician presumably has some obligation to
try to acquire such skill. Failure to do so might be viewed as reckless
or unreasonable under the law, quite apart from any intrinsic risks
associated with the device itself.
Still another protective step that physicians might take in using a
new device would involve considering in detail any specific risks
posed by that device in connection with particular types of procedures
or patients.33 In some ways, this goes back to the idea of becoming
maximally familiar with what the scientific evidence base and the
label instructions have to say about a new device. To the extent that a
device is generally safe and appropriate to use but poses added risks
or safety concerns in particular situations, then consideration of those
sorts of risks could help both to prevent avoidable injuries and to
protect a physician from liability after the fact. Again, the legal
standard in malpractice involves asking what reasonable physicians
would do when faced with similar circumstances. Deliberately and
carefully using available information about risk in order to optimize
treatment, while protecting vulnerable persons from harm, seems
consistent with what medical doctors generally do in clinical practice,
and is a straight-forward step towards limiting malpractice risks.
Finally, in current practice physicians almost universally seek
informed consent from their patients prior to undertaking medical
procedures on a non-emergency basis. 34

Particularly when clinical

care draws on a new medical device, disclosure and informed consent
may allow patients better to understand the nature of their treatment
options, and to make any decisions about risks with advice from their
doctors. Disclosure and consent also give patients the opportunity to
decline treatment options they don't like, and to accept risks that they
feel are appropriate. To the extent that the use of a new device is a
salient focus for risk, or represents a meaningful departure from traditional treatment, incorporating a discussion about the device into
33 This kind of information is typically included in the labeling and evidencebase required by the FDA in connection with the approval of Class H medical devices. See 21 C.F.R § 812.5(a) (2008).
34 For discussion of the common law duty of informed consent in medicine,

see Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Warn or Not To Warn?, 71
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 543, 545-49 (1997).
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informed consent proceedings can give a physician another layer of
security under the malpractice standard. Again, it seems fair to
assume that across many different treatment contexts, reasonable
physicians do not usually conceal significant risks of treatment from
their patients, or usurp control over medical decision-making from
otherwise competent adults.
IV. NEW DEVICES, MALPRACTICE, AND
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HOSPITALS
AND PRACTICE GROUPS
To this point, our discussion of malpractice liability and new medical devices has basically focused on physicians, as the authors of
medical care and the persons ultimately responsible for prescribing
and carrying out clinical interventions. But physicians are not the
only set of parties who face potential malpractice liability in connection with new medical devices and equipment. Hospitals, ambulatory
treatment facilities, and medical provider groups may also be involved
in the adoption of new medical technologies, particularly where the
acquisition of devices and equipment depends upon major, capitalintensive investments.35 Without addressing the myriad legal and
financial issues that these kinds of investments raise, we note that no
discussion of malpractice liability would be complete without offering
some observations about the potential liability impact on corporate
entities involved in delivering health care services, most notably
including hospitals. How do malpractice standards of care extend to
these sorts of organizations, if at all?
Traditionally, hospitals were almost completely protected from
36
malpractice-type liability under the doctrine of charitable immunity.
And even as that doctrine went out of favor in the mid-20 th century,
the staff organization of most hospitals was still designed to preserve
the independence of physicians as medical practitioners, and to limit
the scope of oversight or control exercised by hospitals. Although
most employment relationships serve to make an employer responsible for torts committed by his or her workers within the scope of their
35 In fact, the relationships between physicians, institutional providers, and
insurers are complex, and in connection with medical technology acquisition, can
involve a range of issues and problems going beyond malpractice (e.g., connected
with Stark and anti-fraud statutes). We do not touch on these issues here, other than
to acknowledge that the playing field for new medical technology adoption can be
complicated, and may often involve other players in addition to physicians.
36 Thuy Wagner, Hospitals: Court Rejects Charitable Immunity Defense and
Holds HospitalLiable: Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp, Inc., 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
319, 319 (2000).
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employment, this was not typically true of doctors and hospitals
because the former were regarded as independent contractors, and not
as employees of the latter. 37 Thus, the basic organization of hospitals
protected them against claims of medical malpractice or liability
based on deficient or negligent care delivered by physicians. Decades
ago, that same organizational protection would probably have
protected hospitals against malpractice claims related to the use of
new medical devices where those claims depended on a putative
departure by a treating physician from the medical standard of care.
In more recent decades, though, several changes in the law and in
the business organization of hospitals have made hospitals more
vulnerable to a range of malpractice-related tort claims. Perhaps the
most important change involves the employment status of physicians
vis-A-vis hospitals: in the most recent 10 to 15 years, some hospital
chains have engaged in aggressive reorganizations and acquisitions of
medical practice groups, resulting in an increasing number of physicians entering formal employment relationships with hospitals.
Where that is true, it implies that hospitals can potentially be held
liable for malpractice committed by their employee-physicians regardless of whether the inappropriate use of new medical equipment is
putatively involved. On a similar note, hospitals have also been subject to growing vicarious liability risks: In essence, as hospitals have
held themselves out to their communities as direct providers of highquality medical care, the courts have been increasingly willing to hold
them responsible for acts of malpractice committed in their
involved may not have been
facilities, even where the physicians
38
formal employees of the hospitals.
The scope of direct liability for hospitals has expanded over the
last 20 years. In 1991, an important case on institutional liability
established that hospitals have legal duties that fall into four basic
categories: 1) the "maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and
equipment", 2) selection and retention of competent physicians, 3)
oversight of clinical practice, and 4) formulation and enforcement of
policies to ensure quality of care.39 Interestingly, this kind of logic
suggests another avenue by which hospitals might become liable in
connection with the adoption of new medical technologies and
equipment. To the extent that new equipment requires maintenance
37 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, at 509.
38

See Kuszler, supra note 8, at 321; see also Nicolas P. Terry, When the

"Machine that Goes 'Ping"'Causes Harm: Default Torts Rules and TechnologicallyMediated Health Care Injuries,46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 37, 39-43 (2002).
39 Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991); see also Terry,
supra note 38, at 40.
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and oversight, those functions may fall within the responsibility of the
hospital to provide. Patient injuries sustained as a result of inadequate
maintenance of new medical equipment could potentially support
claims of liability against the hospital directly, as could claims of
inadequate hospital policies to ensure that staff physicians are using
the new equipment with proper training and expertise.4 ° Collectively,
these theories suggest that hospitals may also face significant liability
risks in connection with new device adoption, both vicariously
through their affiliated physicians, and directly through their own
responsibilities to maintain safe facilities and enforce institutional
quality-of-care initiatives.
Importantly, many of these theories of institutional liability for
hospitals ultimately depend on a standard-of-care analysis similar to
what we described above concerning physicians. Vicarious liability
for malpractice committed by staff or employee-physicians depends
on whether those physicians have committed malpractice under the
law. And direct liability for appropriate maintenance and policies
concerning new medical technology invokes its own standard of care,
potentially based on what reasonable organizations would do in similar circumstances. All of the ambiguities concerning malpractice
liability and new devices potentially apply in the context of hospitals
as well-but so too do the basic prophylactic steps of requiring
providers to glean all available knowledge and evidence about the
risks and appropriate use of the new device, obtain appropriate training, and seek patient informed consent to any salient, incremental
risks.
V. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY,
NEW TECHNOLOGY, AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
As we have argued above, the precise contours of the malpractice
standard of care are unclear in connection with the adoption of new
medical technologies. Granted, there are a set of common-sense steps
that most physicians would likely want to take before using new clinical technologies; steps that potentially could help protect against the
imposition of malpractice liability after the fact. But even so, those
steps do not ameliorate the basic legal ambiguity concerning new
device adoption, and how the standard of care for physicians actually
applies in those situations. Perhaps the most important policy issue
that arises here is less how specific cases of alleged malpractice might
40

See Terry, supra note 38, at 47-58.
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be resolved under an ambiguous rule, but rather, the impact that an
ambiguous rule might have on the behavior of physicians more broadly. Recall that the malpractice standard of care is generally intended
to ensure that physicians fulfill their professional duties with appropriate care and skill. In the context of new technology, a key concern
is that the standard may create perverse incentives that have little to
do with preventing or compensating medical injuries, and far more to
do with physicians' perceptions about the potential risks to themselves
associated with medical innovation.
To better understand the potential for perverse incentives, it helps
to consider new technology adoption more broadly, and how the
calculus of costs and benefits associated with new technologies typically works. New medical technologies, in particular, are often quite
costly to develop and expensive for physicians (and their patients) to
obtain. Those costs are necessarily balanced by a set of benefitsotherwise, nobody would be willing to buy the new technology. Note
that some new technologies are desirable for their clinical benefits:
they either support therapeutic functions not previously available, or
else provide risk-superior alternatives to existing treatments. Other
new technologies may be desirable more for efficiency reasons: they
may make it easier (and cheaper) for physicians to deliver treatment
than by conventional means. Either way, in order for a new technology to be cost-effective in the marketplace, its benefits to consumers
(in the simplest case, physicians and patients) need to outweigh its
costs. This is true even where the technology also offers collateral
benefits to a broader set of stakeholders. Thus, a new technology that
is both more efficient and that saves lives compared to the status quo
might plausibly result in a range of social welfare benefits, including
reduced healthcare utilization and costs, reduced mortality and liability risks, improved long-term recovery and productivity among
patients, etc. Regardless, in order to get off the ground, the technology minimally needs to pay for itself-i.e., those who bear the costs
will need to see benefits that equal or exceed
of the new 4technology
1
those costs.
41

Again, adopting new technology in medicine is often more complex than

we describe here, since the acquisition of capital-intensive equipment may involve
hospitals as well as physicians, and the cost-effectiveness of equipment for providers
may also depend on insurers' reimbursement practices and perspectives regarding
new technology. The financial relationships and incentives involved in medical technology adoption can become quite complicated. Nevertheless, the basic principle
remains the same: new technology typically brings both costs and benefits: the benefits need to outweigh the costs for whomever is footing the bill, or else they have no
reason to acquire it, and malpractice risk may represent a significant cost and disin-
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In principle, the challenge posed by ambiguous malpractice liability is that it may escalate the risk to providers, and therefore the cost,
associated with adopting new technology, quite apart from any underlying clinical risk associated with the technology itself.42 But clearly,
that is not the intended purpose of malpractice doctrine. The aim of
malpractice is not to create broad disincentives to innovation, but rather to ensure that providers use appropriate care and skill in delivering medical services, regardless of treatment modality. As we have
already discussed, it is widely understood in the legal community that
medical standards of care evolve over time, in response to new
empirical research and scientific progress.43 Perhaps less understood
in the legal community are physicians' perceptions regarding innovation and malpractice risk, and the possibility that physicians' fears
about ambiguous liability might deter them from considering new
technologies that could otherwise be cost-effective and riskreducing. 44 This kind of indirect result seems undesirable on its face,
centive to physicians in their calculus about whether or not to adopt.
42 Again, the underlying legal premise here is that a bad clinical outcome,
when combined with a new and unorthodox mode of treatment, might be sufficient in
itself to establish a malpractice claim. This is clearly a formulation of malpractice
that distills the standard of care down to a very narrow gloss on professional custom:
if the physician departs from conventional and widely accepted modes of treatment,
then perhaps she takes on the risks of bad outcomes as a result. I have argued that
this rationale is fundamentally flawed as an interpretation of law-nevertheless, to the
extent that medical providers see this as a threat, then it becomes a powerful disincentive to adopting new technologies and new modes of treatment.
43 For a discussion of the "duty to stay abreast," See Williams, supra note 4
at 508-12. Several key precedents have imputed to physicians an obligation to take
into account advances in medical science in their professional practice. See Nowatske
v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp.,
452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Moreover, these cases echo The TJ Hooper case in suggesting another problem in the standard of care doctrine around new
technology: namely, that there is a tipping point beyond which emerging scientific
knowledge can become the basis for a new standard of care, notwithstanding accepted
professional customs to the contrary.
Exactly where that tipping point
occurs, however, involves a matter ofjudgment on the part of courts.
44 On this point, there is no current, good empirical evidence to quantify
what physicians' beliefs are regarding their liability risks connected with new technology. For a discussion detailing empirical evidence quantifying physicians'
beliefs surrounding the liability risks connected with new technology, see David
Dranove & Anne Gron, Effects of the Malpractice Crisis on Access to and Incidence
of High-Risk Procedures: Evidence from Florida, 24 HEALTH AFF. 802 (2005),
Yasmin S. Cypel, Jonathan H. Sunshine & Paul H. Ellenbogen, The Current Medical
Liability Insurance Crisis: Detailed Findingsfrom Two ACR Surveys in 2003 and
2004, 2 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 595 (2005), Pamela; Robinson et al., The Impact of
Medical Legal Risk on Obstetrician-Gynecologist Supply, 105 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1296, 1300 (2005), and Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert,
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even if we restrict our consideration of costs and benefits just to those
that accrue directly to providers and their patients. If we further
recognize that new technology sometimes brings positive externalities
and broader enhancements to social welfare, there is an even stronger
concern regarding the potential for perverse incentives associated with
malpractice doctrine.4 5
Drawing on this logic, there is a basic balance between policy
interests that malpractice law needs to accommodate. In other words,
the underlying question is: What is the ideal set of incentives that we
would want to establish concerning the adoption and use of new technologies by medical providers? Presumably, the answer is that we
would want providers to scrutinize new technologies carefully to
protect their patients against new and incremental clinical risks, and to
apply any new technology with prudence and skill. Beyond the foregoing, we would also want providers to actively consider adopting
new technology where these criteria are met, and where the technology is cost-effective for providers to implement. In some instances,
we might even want to promote new technology that is not costeffective for providers to implement on their own, particularly if we
believe that the technology offers broader social benefits beyond those
that accrue directly to providers or their patients. Obviously, the latter
aims are already implicit in existing federal laws and regulatory
schemes unrelated to malpractice, notably including the FDA's regulation of new devices and pharmaceuticals (designed to produce
information about clinical risks and benefits that would otherwise be
unavailable), the Department of Health and Human Services' financial
support connected with new technology development and dissemination, and state licensing laws regulating the profession of medicine.
Strikingly, though, much of this policy calculus concerning new
technology adoption has not been incorporated into malpractice
doctrine. Malpractice is basically concerned with ensuring that physicians use appropriate prudence and skill in the conduct of their professional activities. Clearly, that concern applies to situations involving
new technology as well. But there is nothing intrinsic about malpracJennifer Schumi, Troyen A. Brennan & William M. Sage, Changes in Physician
Supply and Scope of PracticeDuring a Malpractice Crisis: Evidence from Pennsylvania, 26 HEALTH AFF. w425, w425-35 (2007).
45 Of course, we also need to acknowledge that new technology can sometimes bring negative externalities as well-as in the event of any device-related mass
tort which results many injuries and substantial litigation. In the wake of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, No. 06-179, slip op. at 1-6, Feb. 20,
2008, however, the court affirmed the role of FDA oversight in addressing and
preventing that set of risks.
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tice that calls for discouraging new technology in itself-in some
basic sense, malpractice ought to be indifferent to the technology that
providers use, so long as they use it in a responsible and reasonable
fashion. Put another way, we ideally want to protect people against
negligence or recklessness committed by their physicians, but in so
doing, we do not want to create broad disincentives to new technology
in itself, simply because it is new and not yet widely in use. We do
want physicians to consider the risks and benefits of new technology
before they decide to adopt it. But we do not want the law to create a
diffuse cloud of malpractice liability, such that providers have no
certainty about how the legal system might judge them after the fact.
The legal status quo arguably involves exactly that kind of cloud, with
potential disincentives to new medical technology adoption that are
neither intended nor socially desirable.
One way for judges and policymakers to ameliorate this problem
under malpractice law would be by addressing it explicitly. That is,
where malpractice and new technology collide, policymakers should
focus on that intersection, and provide as much explicit guidance as
possible to disambiguate the legal expectations and liability risks that
physicians face as early adopters. As in addressing any other instance
of regulatory perversity in managing risk, the aim of the law here
should be to acknowledge and incorporate a broader set of policy considerations in seeking to achieve a balanced and appropriate rule (per
Justice Breyer).46 If malpractice incentives and new technology
incentives are operating at cross purposes, then why not try to disentangle them under the law? In the absence of any solid empirical
research quantifying physicians' perceptions about malpractice risks
associated with new technology, we can only infer that there is likely
to be significant fear among physicians around doing new things, and
a corresponding desire to avoid liability standards that are not welldefined under the law. And absent better clarification, it seems unlikely that current malpractice doctrines strike an optimal balance
between incentivizing appropriate skill and diligence in delivering
medical services, and encouraging the optimal use of new technologies in the ongoing effort to improve the quality and efficiency of
care.

46 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE

9-10 (1993) (discussing policy considerations regarding risk
assessment and management).
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CONCLUSION
Any time that a physician adopts and uses a major piece of new
medical technology with a resulting shift in the nature or delivery of
clinical care, the result is the potential for a new set of malpractice
risks. Liability for medical malpractice is based on whether a physician meets a legally required standard of care. That legal standard is
usually defined by medical custom, or else by what other reasonable
physicians would do when confronted with similar circumstances.
New medical technologies present a significant interpretive challenge
for applying the malpractice standard. Because medical devices and
equipment differ from traditional modalities of treatment, most practitioners are not yet using them. A narrow interpretation of the standard
of care might lead to the conclusion that the use of a new device is
unreasonable or not appropriate simply because most physicians have
not adopted it yet. This kind of interpretation of the malpractice standard could impose significant liability risks onto doctors, as well as
onto hospitals and other corporate entities that are in the business of
providing health care services.
I suggest, though, that this is not the correct interpretation of the
malpractice standard. Medical technology changes over time, and
modem medicine is driven by innovation grounded in empirical
science. Other legal doctrines in malpractice acknowledge this by
imposing on physicians an obligation to "stay abreast" of new developments in the field. As applied to the adoption of new equipment
and devices, a broader interpretation of the malpractice standard
would address the circumstances under which reasonable physicians
frequently do make use of new technologies. Where those new technologies pose ambiguous clinical risks, this will still leave physicians
with significant malpractice concerns. But it also suggests some steps
that physicians can take to protect themselves from device-related
liability, such as by reading all of the clinical trial information on the
risks and benefits of a new device, following any pertinent label
instructions, and seeking relevant training where appropriate. These
kinds of steps may help physicians to avoid the occurrence of
preventable injuries in the first place. They also reflect the care and
consideration that one might generally expect of reasonable physicians, especially in dealing with equipment or devices that reflect a
departure from traditional modes of care.
Beyond physicians, the malpractice liability standard also has
implications for technology manufacturers and policymakers. For
manufacturers, malpractice risk represents a significant potential
concern in the consumer market for new products. One way that
manufacturers can respond to this concern is by undertaking rigorous
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testing of those products, in order to identify any related clinical risks,
and to ensure that the products are safe and effective for their intended
purposes. But apart from quantifying and minimizing the objective
risks associated with a new device, manufacturers may also have the
opportunity to help physicians in taking steps to avoid device-related
malpractice risks. Manufacturers can address physicians' malpractice
concerns head-on by sharing available scientific and clinical trial
information, by emphasizing labeling instructions, and by disclosing
any clinical risks that physicians should consider in using a new
device or piece of equipment. Depending on the complexity of the
new technology, manufacturers might also consider providing formal
training in its use, which could be built into the business model for
new devices and equipment, together with ongoing technical support
for the technology. Manufacturers may also be in a unique position to
consult with appropriate medical professional societies, in order to
clarify how a new technology should fit into existing clinical practice
guidelines-something that individual physicians are unlikely to be
able to do for themselves, but that could nevertheless be helpful to
them in seeking to understand and comply with the malpractice
standard.
For policymakers, the challenge presented by malpractice liability
and new medical devices is to strike the right balance between
competing interests. On one hand, we ideally want a set of malpractice rules that protect against medical negligence, and that compensate
victims appropriately. On the other hand, we also want a set of rules
that is clear in application, and that does not create broad disincentives
to medical innovation and the adoption of new technology. Part of the
answer lies simply in affirming the broader interpretation of the
malpractice standard, and the idea that innovation and new device
adoption by physicians is fully consistent with meeting their legal
duties of care. Further clarification of the malpractice standard by
policymakers, and of the steps that reasonable physicians should take
in connection with using new medical devices and equipment, could
help substantially in reducing the ambiguity around device-related
malpractice risks.

